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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
being the recent ruling that the decision in Duncan is not retro-
active.6 0 Unanimity through the imposition of a federal standard
should not be required; rather the states should be allowed to
develop their own jury procedures. It would be a better course
to allow the concepts of practicality and evolutionary progress to
prevail in this instance, rather than to force the states to con-
form to a historical jury pattern.
Judith M. Arnette
TORT LIABILITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS:
STATE REMEDIES
Duty brings the law enforcement officer into touch with all
levels of society. The constant contact with people and his ex-
ercise of a not infallible discretion sometimes leads to the injury
of innocent people or unnecessary abuse of the guilty. This Com-
ment will discuss only the state law although a broad federal
area also exists.1 This Comment has a dual purpose, first, to
discuss the circumstances under which liability of the individual
officer arises, and second, to examine the extent to which the
employing agency may be found liable as a result of the torts of
its policemen. 2
Citizens may be injured by policemen in various ways. Pri-
marily the injuries are caused by the use of "unreasonable force"
in effecting arrest (assault and battery), the making of an im-
proper arrest (false imprisonment, false arrest), and the com-
mission of an unauthorized entry upon a person's lands to search,
seize, or arrest (trespass). Problems also arise in connection
with harms as a result of officers' negligence in failing to take
60. See note 13 supra.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) : "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress." See also
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) ; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2. One phase of liability is the issue of immunity of the individual officer.
In Loe v. Whitman, 107 So.2d 536, 540 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958), the court said:
"[W]hen the defendant (police officer) acts outside of his strict authority he
breaches the condition of his immunity and is liable to a civil action for damages
to persons harmed by his improper conduct." Effectively this means the police-
man has no immunity. Furthermore, even if the officer is acting on orders from
his superior, he is not protected unless such orders are "found fair and reasonable
on their face." Anders v. McConnell, 31 So.2d 237 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957).
[Vol. XXIX
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adequate precautions for the safety of others in their charge or
endangered by their actions.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY
Article 201 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
defines arrest as "the taking of one person into custody by an-
other."'3 It states that "actual restraint" 4 is a requisite and that
such restraint "may be imposed by force." 5 Article 220 imposes
upon the arrested subject a duty to submit peaceably to a law-
ful arrest. Further, it authorizes the use of "reasonable force to
effect the arrest and detention; and... to overcome any resist-
ance or threatened resistance. . ... 06
Louisiana jurisprudence reveals that the officer is liable if
the force he uses exceeds the reasonable force allowed.7 In Stoehr
3. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 201.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. art. 220.
7. Stoehr v. Payne, 132 La. 213, 61 So. 206 (1913) ; Musmeci v. American
Automobile Ins. Co., 146 So.2d 496 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; Espenan v. Carona,
179 So. 119 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938). As to when an officer is justified in using
deadly force as reasonable force, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 131
(1965) supports the view that one can kill a felon if necessary to prevent his
escape: "The actor's use of force against another, for the purpose of effecting a
privileged arrest of the other, by means intended or likely to cause death is privi-
leged if (a) the arrest is made under a warrant which charges the person named
in it with the commission of treason or a felony, or if the arrest is made without
a warrant for treason or for a felony which has been committed, and (b) the other
is the person named in the warrant if the arrest is under a warrant, or the actor
reasonably believes the offense was committed by the other if the arrest is made
without a warrant, and (c) the actor reasonably believes that the arrest cannot
otherwise be effected. Caveat: The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the
use of force which so intended or likely to cause death is privilged to effect a
privileged arrest for a crime which, although only a misdemeanor, is of a type
normally involving danger of death or serious bodily harm."
Prosser says that although courts are not in complete agreement, generally
the rule is "deadly force may be used to enforce the arrest of the dangerous criminal
whose offense had threatened human life or safety, but not one guilty of such
felonies as theft." W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 26 (1964). He also says "there
is no dispute that such force may be used to prevent the commission of a felony
which threatens the life or safety of a human being, including the burglary of a
dwelling house, which by its nature is so regarded. As to felonies which involve
no such danger the tendency in the modern cases is to say that the use of deadly
force is unreasonable in proportion to the offense." Id. at 137. Cf. State v.
Plumlee, 177 La. 687, 149 So. 425 (1933). See generally 6 C.J.S. Arrest § 13(b)
(1937) : "The right to kill a felon is... not absolute, and may be used only as a
last resort, and under circumstances indicating that the felon cannot be other-
wise taken .... It has been held essential that the killing, in order to be justified,
must be necessary, not merely reasonably necessary, and the law does not clothe
an officer with authority arbitrarily to judge of the necessity of the killing." Id.
In Louisiana it seems well settled that an officer cannot use deadly force
to effect arrest in cases involving misdemeanors unless his safety or that of
another person is at stake. Also an officer is held to the standard of reasonableness
in his determination of whether a felony has in fact been committed or is presently
being committed. State v. Turner, 190 La. 198, 182 So. 325 (1938) ; Graham v.
Ogden, 157 So.2d 365 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963). In the Turner case, the defendant
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v. Paynes and Espenan v. Carona,9 the court held the defendant
policemen liable for damages resulting from "unnecessary vio-
lence"1o or "unnecessary brutality"" whether the arrest they
were effecting was lawful or not. In Stoehr the town marshall
used his pistol to strike an intoxicated citizen who had become
rowdy. Although the court found that the officer was justified
in arresting the plaintiff, he was not justified in using such
force to subdue him. A similar situation arose in Espenan. The
defendant officer arrested the plaintiff, an ice cream vendor,
for selling without a license. In the ensuing hassle, the plaintiff
sustained injuries. Although the court was satisfied that the
arrest was in order, the issue of the officer's, liability was to be
determined by the reasonableness of the force he employed.
12
One factor which Louisiana courts have used to determine
whether or not the force employed by police officers was reason-
able has been the relative physical size and strength of the of-
ficer.5 The court in Musmeci v. American Auto. Ins. Co.1"
was impressed by the fact that the plaintiff was a 125-pound
drunk; as opposed to a 250-pound officer, in finding that the
officer had acted with unreasonable force. Similarly, in Stoehr
v. Payne, 5 the court felt that defendant marshall and his deputy
policeman had been hired to work extra duty guarding a scrap yard where
numerous thefts had been committed. The victim and his lady friend, on the
night in question, were parked in the scrap yard area. The defendant, thinking
the victim a thief, called for him to stop when he attempted to drive away. When
he failed to do so, the officer killed him when he fired at the car. The Supreme
Court held that it was unreasonable for the defendant, considering the size of
the automobile and the value of the scrap as stolen goods, to believe that a felony
had been committed. The court said it is "well settled that.., an officer cannot
take human life in attempting the prevention of a misdemeanor." State v. Turner,
190 La. 198, 202, 182 So. 325, 326 (1938).
8. 132 La. 213, 61 So. 206 (1913).
9. 179 So. 119 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938).
10. Id. at 120.
11. Stoehr v. Payne, 132 La. 213, 61 So. 206 (1913).
12. In Espenan, the court said: "We have no difficulty in finding the law
to be as stated by plaintiff's counsel that when a town marshall or other enforce-
ment officer undertakes to make an arrest and in doing so uses unnecessary violence
or brutality, he is liable for such injuries as he may inflict." 179 So. 119, 120
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938). The degree of force which is reasonable is to be de-
termined from facts as seen and understood by the officer when he is required to
act. Crawford v. Maryland Cas. Co., 169 So.2d 612 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964) ;
cf. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 220, comment (b), which says that although "the
force employed must be reasonable, both as to the nature and amount of force...,
it is neither just nor sound policy to impose a test of actual necessity upon a
person who is performing a public service, and acting on the spur of the moment,
in making an arrest. Yet a requirement of reasonableness would preclude the use
of clearly inappropriate force."
13. Stoehr v. Payne, 132 La. 213, 61 So. 206 (1913) ; Crawford v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 169 So.2d 612 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Musmeci v. American Auto.
Ins. Co., 146 So.2d 496 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
14. 146 So.2d 496 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
15. 132 La. 213, 61 So. 206 (1913).
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were men of sufficient strength to handle the boisterous and
drunken plaintiff without striking him in the head with a pistol.
The fact that an officer often must make a quick decision is
appreciated by the court. In Crawford v. Maryland Cas. Co.16 the
plaintiff was stopped by an officer for drunken driving. The
plaintiff argued with the officer and thrust his hand suspiciously
into his pocket. The officer, alarmed by his sudden action, struck
plaintiff with his club. Although finding that the force used had
an "unfortunate and tragic result,"'' the court determined that
the officer had acted reasonably under the circumstances.' 8
The "aggressor rule" has been used by law enforcement of-
ficers as a defense to suits alleging assault and battery against
them.19 In Smith v. Clemmons,2 0 the court sustained the district
court's instruction to the jury that they must find the defendant
free of liability unless the plaintiff established her freedom from
fault in the encounter. 2' The plaintiff alleged that she telephoned
for assistance from the sheriff's office after being assaulted on
the streets by an intoxicated person. Minutes later the defendant
deputy arrived and began to question a bystander in an effort
to determine the cause of the disturbance. When the plaintiff ap-
proached the defendant officer to inform him that she had tele-
phoned the sheriff's office, defendant allegedly said, "shut up,
I'm not talking to you." Plaintiff alleged she again interrupted
defendant, whereupon he struck her with a night stick and placed
her under arrest. Deputy Thompson asserted that the plaintiff,
in a drunken condition, had abused and attacked him from the
16. 169 So.2d 612 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
17. Id. at 614.
18. Id.: "The risks which are necessarily faced by peace officers in the
discharge of their duties cannot be over-emphasized. An incident of the nature
which is here under consideration is of such instantaneous development and im-
mediate menace that it does not afford time for reflection and consideration as to
the nature or degree of necessary force which an officer might use in protection
of his own life and safety."
19. Veillon v. Sylvester, 174 So.2d 189 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) ; Smith, v.
Clemmons, 48 So.2d 813 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950). In Veillon, plaintiff, a deputy
sheriff, was prevented from recovering for his injuries resulting from an en-
counter which resulted from plaintiff's attempt to arrest defendant. The court
said: "[I]t is clear that he provoked the difficulty which led to any assault...
and... thus is prevented from recovering damages... because [the deputy] ... used
more force than was necessary in the performance of his duties." 174 So.2d 189,
192 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). See Comment, 12 LA. L. REV. 469, 484 (1952).
20. 48 So.2d 813 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950) (suit for assault, battery, and
false imprisonment against East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff Bryan Clemmons,
and Deputy Thompson).
21. Id. at 815: "The issue involved... is whether the attack upon plaintiff
was provoked by her.... It is well established that a plaintiff cannot recover
civil damages in this state if it is shown that such plaintiff has been at fault in
provoking the difficulty in which the injury is received [citations omitted]."
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rear before he struck her.2 2 The jury verdict for the defendant
was not predicated on a finding that the force used was reason-
able, but rather that plaintiff had provoked the difficulty.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
An officer may validly make an arrest when either he has
reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has com-
mitted an offense2 3 or he has a warrant of arrest valid on its
face.24 Officers, however, will be liable for false imprisonment
when they make an arrest without a warrant or without "reason-
able cause. '2 5 In Gladney v. DeBretton,26 plaintiff, an attorney,
went to the jail to interview a client. When told by deputies that
he would have to be searched first, he objected and requested to
know on whose authority this was being done. The deputy said
it was on orders from the sheriff and promptly called him. The
sheriff told his deputy to hold plaintiff while he came up to
search him, whereupon he was locked in a cell to await the
sheriff's arrival. Plaintiff recovered on the basis of false im-
prisonment. In another case, Abraham v. Boat Center,2 7 a deputy
sheriff was sued for false arrest. Plaintiff, a local business man,
had stopped payment on a check given the complainant because
he feared an outboard motor he had acquired from them was de-
fective. The deputy was aware of the facts when he issued a pick-
up order on the plaintiff. Without the officer's knowledge, plain-
tiff and complainant had made a restitution arrangement and
considered the matter dropped. In deciding for plaintiff, the
court was impressed with the fact that the defendant deputy
had no reason to believe that the plaintiff's actions displayed an
22. Defendant alleged that he did not know his assailant was a woman. The
court noted a great deal of conflicting testimony which the jury resolved in favor
of the defendant.
23. LA. CODE CRI. P. art. 213.
24. Id. authorizes an officer to make an arrest if he has "reasonable cause
to believe that the person to be arrested committed an offense." Offense is in-
terpreted to include both felonies and misdemeanors. Under id. art. 204, an of-
ficer with a warrant may also arrest. Several cases have held that the officer is
protected from civil liability if he acts under a warrant which appears valid on
its face. Martin v. Magee, 182 La. 263, 161 So. 604 (1935) ; McGuire v. Hughes,
13 La. Ann. 281 (1858) ; Brown v. Dawkins, 2 La. App. 213 (2d Cir. 1925).
25. Gladney v. DeBretton, 218 La. 296, 49 So.2d 18 (1950) ; Abraham v.
Boat Center, Inc., 146 So.2d 23 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). It has been held that
the question of reasonable cause is identical with the peace officer's right to arrest.
Gould v. Gardner, 11 La. Ann. 289 (1856). Reasonable cause and guilt cannot
be equated. The former is merely a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a cautious man in believing in the
guilt of the accused. Glisson v. Biggio, 139 La. 23, 71 So. 204 (1916) ; Sandoz v.
Veazie, 106 La. 202, 30 So. 767 (1901); State v. Marchetti, 247 La. 649, 173
So.2d 531 (1965) (criminal case defining probable cause).
26. 218 La. 296, 49 So.2d 18 (1950).
27. 146 So.2d 23 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
(Vol. XXIX
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intent to defraud which was required by the statute under which
plaintiff was arrested. 28 Thus, having no warrant and no reason-
able cause to believe that a felony was committed, the defendant
had no authority to arrest the plaintiff.
29
As with the case of reasonable force, the standard of reason-
able cause is determined from the officer's point of view, that
is, on appearances deduced from facts known to him. The courts
recognize that officers must be given some discretion in order
to perform their duties. They do not wish to discourage diligent
law enforcement by making officers unduly apprehensive about
personal liability for damages.30 However, there is an obligation
on the officer to obtain a good grasp of the facts by a proper
investigation. 31
TRESPASS
In the area of liability for trespass and resultant damages,
it seems clear that the officer has no right to be present on an
individual's premises without a search warrant or probable cause
to believe that a subject whom he seeks to arrest is present.
28. The court's language indicates that the defendant acted hastily when
there was no necessity. Id. at 27. See also Thomas v. Henderson, 125 La. 292, 51
So. 202 (1910).
29. A distinction must be drawn between suits for malicious prosecution and
those for false imprisonment. False imprisonment involves arrests without legal
authority. Barfield v. Marron, 222 La. 210, 62 So.2d 276 (1952) ; DeBouchel v.
Koss Constr. Co., 177 La. 841, 149 So. 496 (1933) ; Hunter v. Laurent, 158 La.
874, 104 So. 747 (1925) ; Lange v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 107 La. 687, 31 So.
1003 (1902) ; Wells v. Johnston, 52 La. Ann. 713, 27 So. 185 (1898) ; Wells v.
Gaspard, 129 So.2d 245 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961). Both malice and want of reason-
able cause are required for malicious prosecution. Glisson v. Biggio, 139 La.
23, 71 So. 204 (1916) ; Glynn v. Lenormand, 80 So.2d 896 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1955) ; Melson v. Calhoun, 10 La. App. 492, 120 So. 115 (1929). In suits for
false imprisonment the sole issue is whether the detention was without reason-
able cause. In Wells v. Gaspard, 129 So.2d 245 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961), it was
said that the sole issue in an action for false arrest is the legal authority of the
arrest. In Lange v. Illinois R.R., 107 La. 687, 701, 31 So. 1003, 1009 (1902) the
court said that "the existence of probable cause may protect a person even though
he be acting from malice, but the converse of this proposition is not true." The good
faith of the officer is no defense: Barrios v. Yoars, 182 So. 212 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1938). The gist of the action is the wrongful detention. The issue of malice
is only important in determining the amount of damages. Wells v. Johnston, 52 La.
Ann. 713, 27 So. 185 (1898).
30. Lyons v. Carroll, 107 La. 471, 474, 31 So. 760, 761 (1902): "Those
who honestly seek the enforcement of law and the administration of justice, and
who are supported 'by circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a cautions man
in the belief that the party suspected may be guilty of the offense charged, should
not be made unduly apprehensive that they will be held answerable in damages.
See also 160 La. 21, 106 So. 660 (1925). Note, 17 TUL. L. REv. 81 (1942) gives
a discussion of the need to give the police officer greater latitude of discretion to
arrest than the private citizen.
31. Janes v. Wilson, 119 La. 491, 44 So. 275 (1907); Abraham v. Boat
Center, Inc., 146 So.2d 23 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; Loe v. Whitman, 107 So.2d
536 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958); Poole v. Whitman, 107 So.2d 542 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1958).
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The officer also may go onto a person's property for proper in-
vestigative purposes unless he has been ordered to stay away
or otherwise knows he is unwelcome to enter without specific
permission.3 2
Article 164, dealing with the execution of search warrants,
provides that no more force may be used to execute a search
warrant than is provided in the chapter on arrest.3 Article
216, 3 providing that arrest may be made at any time and at any
place, authorizes the officer to enter private premises or lands
to arrest. Article 2242 further allows the use of appropriate force
to enter. When the entry is not authorized by law, the cases hold
the officer liable for harms which follow from unconsented
entries.26
In Loe v. Whitman37 and Poole v. Whitman,3 companion
cases, two state troopers, believing plaintiff's mules had strayed
on certain designated highways, entered plaintiff's property and
seized the mules. In fact the highway was not one so designated
and the defendant troopers had no authority to trespass on
plaintiff's land. The court held error of law no defense. It was
concerned only with the fact that an unreasonable mistake had
been made by the officers and that plaintiff was "harmed by
their improper conduct. '3 9
Similarly, in Gilbeau v. Tate,40 two wildlife agents entered
plaintiff's property without a search warrant after Gilbeau had
instructed Agent Tate to keep off his property. There had been
prior disagreements between them. When Gilbeau attempted to
32. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 162 provides for the issuance of search warrants
upon "probable cause." This applies to searches of both persons and places. Without
a search warrant or consent, it is clear that the search of a place (unless in-
cidental to a lawful arrest) would render the participating officer liable in trespass.
Gilbeau v. Tate, 94 So.2d 896 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) ; Anders v. McConnell,
31 So.2d 237 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
33. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 164: "In order to execute a search warrant, a
peace officer may use such means and force as are authorized for the arrest
by Title V." Id. art. 224 provides that the officer may forcibly enter to arrest:
"In order to make an arrest a peace officer who has announced his authority
and purpose, may break open an outer or inner door or window ... where the person
to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused or otherwise ob-
structed from admittance. The peace officer need not announce his authority and
purpose when to do so would imperil the arrest."
34. Id. art. 216.
35. Id. art. 224.
36. Poole v. Whitman, 107 So.2d 542 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958) ; Loe v. Whit-
man, 107 So.2d 536 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958) ; Gilbeau v. Tate, 94 So.2d 896 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1957) ; Anders v. McConnell, 31 So.2d 237 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
37. 107 So.2d 536 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
38. 107 So.2d 542 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
39. Loe v. Whitman, 107 So.2d 536, 540 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
40. 94 So.2d 896 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
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forcibly eject Tate a fight erupted and Gilbeau was injured.
In its decision the court treated Agent Tate as an "ordinary
trespasser" and awarded damages. The court said that he had
neither warrant nor probable cause to believe that the law had
been violated. 41
NEGLIGENCE
An excellent treatment concerning negligence in the per-
formance of police functions is found in Graham v. Ogden.42
In that case, the defendant, Deputy Ogden, was making a routine
check of a barroom when he was attacked by a drunk whom he
was attempting to arrest. Ogden pulled his gun and fired a shot
into the floor. The drunk continued his assault undeterred and
in the struggle, the deputy's pistol discharged accidentally killing
a patron. It was contended that Ogden's negligent act of drawing
his gun resulted in the death of the patron.4 3 Admitting that the
issue of reasonableness of the force used to arrest has a "direct
bearing on the question of negligence of the arresting officer as
to third persons, ' 44 the court felt "the basic inquiry is whether
the officer acted reasonably under the circumstances. ' 4-5 The test
it cites for reasonableness is "whether the utility of the act of the
officer outweighed the risk of harm to others."' 46 In other words,
the court evaluates the question of the officer's negligence in the
light of the purpose he was trying to accomplish when the
alleged negligent act occurred. For example, a high-speed chase
down crowded streets might be justifiable to apprehend an
armed robber; whereas it would be a negligent act if merely to
catch a speeder.
47
There appears also to devolve upon officers a duty to use
reasonable care in ascertaining whether or not an arrest should
be made. He must use care to see that the law has been violated
and that he has the right man. In Abraham v. Boat Center,48
previously discussed, the court found that the defendant officer
41. Id. at 899-900.
42. 157 So.2d 365 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
43. Id. at 366.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965).
47. In determining whether the manner in which the act was done was
reasonable, the character and purpose of the act must be thrown into the balance.
In Miami v. Horne, 198 So.2d 10, 13 (Fla. 1967), the court dealt with such a
problem by saying: "In determining whether an officer ... acted negligently or
recklessly, it is to be borne in mind that he is charged with the duty of arresting
the offender and must often exceed the precautions normally imposed on indi-
viduals."
48. 146 So.2d 23 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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was negligent in acting without first checking with his com-
plainant after a week had passed without hearing from either
party.49 In Poole v. Whitman5" and Loe v. Whitman,51 the court
held that ignorance of the law is no defense to an action against
police officers for negligence in making an illegal arrest.
52
Negligence suits against officers for failure to act frequently
arise in cases involving injured prisoners. In a suit against the
town marshall and his deputy for negligently placing the plaintiff
unguarded in a jail cell where two dangerous drunks could in-
jure him, the court, in holding for the defendant, said:
"The law imposes the duty on a jailer to exercise reasonable
and ordinary care and diligence to prevent unlawful injury
to a prisoner placed in his custody, but he cannot be charged
with negligence in failing to prevent what he could not rea-
sonably anticipate.
' 53
It logically follows from the holding that an officer is re-
quired to use reasonable care to protect a prisoner from other
prisoners or conditions which might be reasonably anticipated
to be a source of harm to him.5 4 Clearly the officer owes the
49. Id. at 26-27: The court stated that "the normal prudent course.., would
have been to check with Boat Center in view of the fact that its officials were
readily available and yet had seen fit to let the entire matter lie dormant for a
week.... [T]he sole inquiry here is whether Captain Dwyer (defendant) had under
all circumstances 'reasonable cause' to believe that (1) a felony had been com-
mitted and (2) that plaintiff was the culprit. ... The court is of the opinion
that the admitted facts failed to justify such beliefs on defendant Dwyer's part;
and that, all things considered, he was negligent in obtaining the arrest and de-
tention of plaintiff."
50. 107 So.2d 542 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
51. 107 So.2d 536 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
52. The public has an interest is not being subjected to false arrest and
harassment by police officers. The Louisiana Supreme Court, id. at 540-41, said:
"As to the position taken by the defendants that they are unlearned in the law, we
are not impressed and the answer is that they were law enforcement officers. The
public is not to 'be subjected to arrest and harassment by enforcement officers
for acts which are erroneously deemed by the officers to constitute offenses when,
in reality, they are not, as would have been disclosed :by a casual investigation.
Ignorance of the law, as has often been stated, is no excuse. This should have
particular application to the officers charged with its enforcement. A thorough
knowledge of their duties and of the laws they are charged with enforcing are in-
dispensable."
53. Honeycutt v. Bass, 187 So. 848, 851 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
54. In Cobb v. Jeansonne, 50 So.2d 100, 106 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951), the
court held that regardless of the offense for which the arrest was made, the
arresting officer was under a duty to provide the prisoner with reasonable medical
service. In St. Julian v. Louisiana, 98 So.2d 284, 285 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957),
the court noted that "the general rule gathered from the cases is that in order
to hold the State or the employee of a state who have charge of a prisoner liable
for injury to one inmate inflicted by another inmate, there must be knowledge on
the part of such officers in charge that such injuries will be inflicted, or good
reason to anticipate such, and following that, there must 'be a showing of negligence
on the part of the officials in failing to prevent the injury." See also Shuff v.
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suspect who is in custody a greater duty of care than he owes
the "man on the street." Basically the issue is to what extent
will the courts impose liability for omission to act.55
In Schuster v. City of New York, 56 plaintiff's decedent was
shot and killed following his informing on Willie "The Actor"
Sutton. Deceased received anonymous threats and was given tem-
porary police protection. After protection was discontinued,
deceased was shot by an unknown assailant. Sovereign immunity
was waived and the plaintiff recovered on a negligence theory.57
The writer in the Louisiana Law Review 5 pointed out that the
policy behind the increased duty under these circumstances was
to encourage cooperation by informers with police authorities.
It was also noted that such a rule could open a veritable "Pan-
dora's Box of liability." 59 To hold the officer or the city liable
for harm resulting from their negligent failure to act in every
case would impose too great a financial burden on the law en-
forcement authorities and also encourage excessive litigation. It
is therefore submitted that suit for negligent failure to act be
limited to those situations in which the defendant officer has
created or played a part in creating the peril of the plaintiff or
in which the plaintiff has reasonably and detrimentally relied on
the defendant's promise to act60
LIABILITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL OFFICER AND HIS EMPLOYER
The general rule in Louisiana is that the municipality bears
Zurich American Ins. Co., 173 So.2d 392, 395 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965), in
which the court found that the arresting officer, by placing the intoxicated plaintiff
in jail, "negligently failed to take proper precautions to insure plaintiff's safety"
when plaintiff later fell and injured himself.
55. As regards criminal liability for failure to act, in State v. Scheurering,
226 La. 660, 76 So.2d (1954), the Supreme Court held the police commissioner
of New Orleans guilty of malfeasance for failure to arrest two police officers
whom he had reason to believe committed a burglary. This case would thus seem
to support the contention that there is an affirmative duty to arrest offenders.
Cf. LA. R.S. 15:704 (1950) : "Each sheriff shall ... by all lawful means preserve
the peace and apprehend all disturbers thereof, and other public offenders."
56. 5 N.Y.2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958), noted 19 LA.
L. REV. 910 (1959).
57. The court found a culpable omission in the failure to protect.
58. Note, 19 LA. L. REv. 910 (1959).
59. Id. at 916.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965) states that there is
a special relation giving rise to a duty to aid or protect where "one who is re-
quired by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under cir-
cumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for pro-
tection."
61. Taulli v. Gregory, 223 La. 195, 65 So.2d 312 (1953) ; Martin v. Magee,
179 La. 913, 155 So. 433 (1934) ; Duncan v. City of Pineville, 192 So.2d 664
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1966) ; Demars v. Town of Mansura, 166 So.2d 328 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1964) ; Brown v. City of Shreveport, 129 So.2d 540 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1961).
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no liability: for the tortious conduct of its police6 but the law
in this area is in a state of flux.62 In Pierce v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.
of N. y.,63 the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit held that
the charter of the City of Baton Rouge providing that the munici-
pal corporation has the authority "to sue and be sued" waived
the traditional immunity from the liability for torts of employees
in the performance of the municipalities governmental func-
tions. 64 This position could easily be extended to hold a munici-
pality liable for a policeman's tortious conduct. In 1957 the
Supreme Court of Florida in Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach65 held a
municipality liable for the torts of its policemen. 66 An Article
in the Miami Law Review 67 refers to the Hargrove case6 8 as
sounding a key for the entire nation. If this trend is adopted by
Louisiana courts the traditional immunity enjoyed by munici-
palities for the torts of their police will disappear.
It is clear that the sheriff is liable for the tortious conduct
of his deputies when they act in official capacity.69 In Robertson
v. Palmer,70 a deputy under the influence of intoxicants was in-
vestigating a traffic accident. When a bystander injected him-
self into the matter the deputy beat and shot him to prevent
further interference. The court found the harm was inflicted as
a result of the improper manner in which an official act was
carried out and held the sheriff liable. 71 In another case 72 a
deputy sheriff attempted to entice a woman to leave a man's
62. Governmental immunity is waived when the municipal charter authorizes
the municipality to sue and to be sued. Hamilton v. City of Shreveport, 247 La.
784, 174 So.2d 529 (1965) ; Pierce v. Fidelity Cas. Co. of New York, 205 So.2d
831 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968) ; Walesch v. City of New Orleans, 195 So.2d 302
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1967) ; Lambert v. Austin Bridge Co., 189 So.2d 752 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1966).
63. 205 So.2d 831 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968) (suit arising from alleged negli-
gence of a city garbage truck driver).
64. LA. CONST. art. III, § 35 provides for waiver of the immunity from suit
and from liability of municipalities and parishes, and other governmental entities,
by special or general statute.
65. 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
66. Id. at 133-34: "We here merely recede from the prior cases in order
to establish a rule which we are convinced will be productive of results more
nearly consonant with the demands of justice."
67. Shapo, Municipal Liability Jor Police Torts, 17 Mi!mi L. REv. 475
(1963).
68. 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
69. Grey v. De Bretton, 192 La. 628, 188 So. 722 (1939) ; Sanders v. Hum-
phries, 143 La. 43, 78 So. 168 (1918) ; Polizzi v. Trist, 154 So.2d 84 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1963) ; Jackson v. Steen, 92 So.2d 280 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957).
70. 55 So.2d 68 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
71. Accord, Brit v. Merritt, 45 So.2d 902 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950). The
Supreme Court reversed as to the liability of the sheriff on its finding of fact that
the deputy's assault on the plaintiff was motivated by personal animosity and was
not within his official capacity.
72. Davis v. McDowell, 185 So. 634 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
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residence by purporting to arrest her on a warrant. When a
dispute arose concerning the validity of'the warrant, :the deputy
fired his pistol, killing the plaintiff's husband. The court, in
finding the sheriff not liable, said, "[N]either the sheriff nor
his bondsman [are] responsible for the wrongful act unless it
was done in violation or in an unfaithful or improper perform-
ance of an official duty. '78 Similarly, in Bolton v. Sevario7 a
sheriff was found not liable for the excessive force used by his
deputy. Deputy Sevario was in a Baton Rouge night club when
he struck plaintiff with a club and shot him to quell a disturb-
ance. The court found that since he was not assigned there by
the sheriff to keep peace but was "merely a guest of the night
club," 75 his actions would not render the sheriff liable. The
test of liability of the sheriff for the wrongful acts of his de-
puties seems to be whether the deputy was acting in furtherance
of his official duties or acting from a solely personal motive.76
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the structure of the tort liability of police-
men in Louisiana should be re-examined. Wrongful harm to
suspects and the general public is one of the costs of law en-
forcement and a burden which law enforcement as a whole
must bear. In a society in which answers to a growing crime
rate and a growing awareness of individual rights do not seem
to cohere, it will be the job of the courts to examine the con-
duct of law enforcement officers with growing frequency.
Learned Hand said that excessive restrictions on individual of-
ficers will surely blunt the efforts of "all but the most resolute
or most irresponsible. 7 7 Yet, too much leniency will work a
hardship on those suspects who are improperly handled. Who
should pay for unjustified inconvenience and harm to society
caused by law enforcement officers? It is argued that the em-
ploying agency should pay.
One writer 78 criticizes the system of governmental immunity
73. Id. at 637.
74. 25 So.2d 115 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946).
75. Id. at 117: "[I]n. order to hold a sheriff liable for a wrong committed 'by
his deputy, such wrong must have been committed while in the actual performance
of an official act." The court also pointed out that the mere fact that Sevario
was present at the night club would not bind the sheriff for any acts done by the
said Sevario.
76. It was not alleged that ,Sevario was attempting to arrest the plaintiff.
If he had successfully established that Sevario was acting in his official capacity
he could have recovered from the sheriff.
77. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
78. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39
MIAMI L. REV. 493 (1955).
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with regard to police liability as ineffective. He suggests that
"governmental liability is important not only to provide finan-
cially responsible defendants, but primarily so that the deterrent
will be effective where it is needed-at the level where police
policy is made.7 " Another writer suggests a "scope of official
duties" for law enforcement officers wherein they enjoy im-
munity for their acts."' What should be included in this "scope
of official duties"? The previously discussed cases defining
harms by deputies for which the sheriff is liable provide a good
test.s2 Thus, for liability to attach to the agency and not to the
obligor it should be required that the wrongful act be done while
the officer is acting in furtherance of some official duty.83
Clearly malicious harms done for personal motives would be ex-
cluded since these are acts for which the officer alone should be
personally 'liable. Basically the officer would only enjoy im-
munity for anY harm committed while acting in furtherance of
his official duty.84
Immunity of the individual law enforcement officer for his
official acts is crucial. The many risks and uncertainties faced
by police every day, require this. The rule which holds the of-
ficer liable for damages if he fails to act within the bounds of
his legal authority is overly strict. The judiciary draws those
bounds with terms like "probable cause" and "reasonable force,"
placing it within the discretion of courts to expand or deny the
authority of police.
79. Id. at 514.
80. Mathes & Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" for Police Officers
in Damage Actions, 53 GEORGETOWN L.J. 889 (1963).
81. Id. at 907-08. The authors suggest seven defects in the present system:
(1) Threat of financial liability is a continual and substantial deterrent to
vigorous law enforcement. (2) It is unjust to penalize officers for doing a duty
encumbent on hqm, i,.e., arrest, when their error is simply one of "reasonable
judgment." (3) The officer, except where he acts in "clear excess" of lawful
powers, acts for the state, not for himself. (4) Competent studies show that in-
centive to safety and proper execution of duty are greatest where tort liability
is imposed on the large corporate defendant rather than on the individual. (5)
Absent insurance, the remedy against the officer is illusory. (6) Where the officer's
fault is the criterion of liability, actions to enforce individual liability may force
the courts to review the propriety of police-executive actions. This may involve
a conflict between the court and a coordinate branch of government. (7) Liability
may discourage some responsible people from entering police work.
82. Earlier it wasinoted that Louisiana courts would not impose liability on
the sheriff for the wrongful conduct of his deputy unless it was done in violation
of or in an unfaithful performance of an official duty. See notes 69-77 supra.
: .:83. Making: an arrest, seizing property, searching for contraband, and con-
ducting an investigation would clearly be acts done in furtherance of an official
duty.
84. The officer who shoots a personal enemy or engages in a barroom fight
would not be covered by official immunity while one who used unnecessary force
to make an arrest would be covered.
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Good results in controlling personnel have been obtained by
large corporations when liability is imposed on the corporation
itself.8 5 If the agency is to be liable for a policeman's torts, the
Sheriff or the City Police Department heads will be forced to
control carefully the conduct of its employees. Such control will
aid in curbing abuses by individual police officers.
The imposition of liability on the agency together with im-
munity of the officer will achieve the goals of encouraging
vigorous law enforcement and providing individuals unjustly
harmed redress for their grievances. Such a liability structure
would further the triangle of interests involved: the policeman,
the injured person, and society as a whole. First, it serves to free
the officer from fear of personal loss in the course of his already
hazardous occupation. Secondly, it provides a "deep pocket" from
which the injured suspect may draw funds for his damages.
Thirdly, it will serve the interest of the public by encouraging
law enforcement officers to act. Society is in the awkward posi-
tion of wanting protection from criminals through its police
and protection from its police through its courts. It is submitted
that the only rational way to achieve this goal is to pass on to
society the costs of harms done to its members by its police in
their efforts to protect that society.
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr.
85. Mathes & Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" for Police Officers
in Damage Actions, 53 GEORGETOWN L.J. 889, 907, 908 (1965).
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